daily sun
Simon Mohsin
Publish: Wednesday, 05 March, 2025
The rise of the Arakan Army in Myanmar’s Rakhine State has significantly altered the region’s geopolitical landscape. With the group now controlling the entire 271-km border with Bangladesh, its ascendancy poses a dual challenge—both a national security threat and a humanitarian crisis for Dhaka. Yet, despite this shifting reality, Bangladesh remains indecisive, relying on traditional diplomatic approaches that have yielded limited results. The need for a recalibrated, pragmatic approach is more urgent than ever.
The Arakan Army’s dominance presents new complexities and potential opportunities. As the de facto authority in much of Rakhine, the group has captured key military strongholds, weakening Naypyidaw’s grip over the region. This directly impacts Bangladesh, influencing cross-border security, refugee flows, and humanitarian aid efforts. Dhaka has been cautious, adhering to a state-to-state engagement policy that does not fully reflect evolving dynamics. Myanmar’s military has little incentive to engage in meaningful negotiations. If Bangladesh is to safeguard its national interests and address the Rohingya crisis effectively, it must acknowledge the new power dynamics and adopt a more strategic response.
The Arakan Army’s continued consolidation of power in Rakhine State presents opportunities and challenges for Myanmar’s broader resistance movement. If the AA successfully expels the military junta, it could embolden other ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) to intensify offensives. However, this victory could also deepen divisions within the resistance movement, as the AA’s political ambitions may not align with those of other EAOs or the parallel National Unity Government (NUG). Some factions seek a federal democratic union, while the AA may push for complete independence, further complicating efforts to build a unified opposition to the junta.
At the same time, the humanitarian crisis in the Rakhine State is worsening. The growing displacement of civilians, compounded by food shortages and restricted humanitarian access, threatens to create a catastrophe. The situation is particularly dire for the Rohingya, whose future remains uncertain under AA rule. While the group has claimed it will allow Rohingya repatriation, its past actions and lack of concrete policies raise doubts about its commitment to ensuring their safety and rights. If the AA consolidates control over Rakhine, international actors will need to engage cautiously, ensuring that any recognition of AA governance is contingent on protecting all ethnic communities, including the Rohingya.
This is not just a matter of military victories and defeats; Rakhine is central to significant geopolitical calculations. China and India have strategic interests and substantial investments in the Bay of Bengal region surrounding Rakhine. The US Burma Act of 2021 also highlights the importance of the region. None of these powers want its stability disrupted. Regional actors, including Bangladesh, India, and China, closely monitor the situation. For Bangladesh, the instability along its border increases the risk of violence and further refugee displacement. The AA's dominant position in Rakhine will influence the region's fate, Myanmar's ongoing civil conflict, and its implications for regional stability.
Established in 2009, the AA has steadily expanded its influence, now controlling 14 townships in Rakhine State. The loss of the Western Command, crucial for securing China’s investments and India’s Kaladan project, has far-reaching implications for regional geopolitics. Rakhine, rich in natural resources and strategically significant for trade routes, is undergoing profound transformations. The AA’s vision, encapsulated in the “Arakan Dream,” seeks to restore Rakhine’s self-determination. However, the conflict has devastated the local economy and disrupted trade. The AA must now focus on securing the region, establishing inclusive administration, and revitalizing economic ties with India and Bangladesh.
The recent military successes of the AA have led to its near-total control over the Bangladesh-Myanmar border, previously overseen by Myanmar’s Border Guard Police. With the collapse of junta outposts near Maungdaw, Bangladesh faces increasing security challenges, including fears of heightened cross-border instability and a potential surge in refugee movements. Dhaka, already sheltering nearly one million Rohingya refugees, has responded by strengthening border security.
As the junta loses control in Rakhine, whether the AA will pursue diplomatic negotiations with Bangladesh or adopt an isolationist approach remains uncertain. While the AA has indicated a willingness to accept Rohingya refugees, it has not provided a clear framework for their repatriation, complicating Bangladesh’s efforts to address the crisis. Stray mortar shells killing civilians in Bandarban and the influx of 330 Myanmar military personnel seeking refuge further highlight the war’s spillover effects. While Bangladesh successfully repatriated the military personnel, its primary concern remains the situation in the Rakhine State. Although Bangladesh does not support insurgent groups, maintaining a communication channel with the Arakan Army could serve its long-term interests.
Since the 2021 coup, observers speculated that Chin and Kayah States would likely break free of SAC control. However, after renewed fighting in Rakhine, the AA's gains have sparked speculation that Rakhine might be the first to be fully liberated. Even so, questions remain about the extent of this liberation, especially as SAC forces continue bombardments. Armed clashes between the AA and Rohingya groups, such as the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO), and the SAC’s Rohingya recruits, further complicate the situation. Despite challenges, the AA’s successes have ignited local hopes for greater autonomy, a sentiment deeply rooted in Rakhine’s history of resistance against Myanmar’s central rule.
Even if the AA establishes de facto control, it will face challenges in addressing Rakhine's socioeconomic needs. The region's poor transportation connectivity and reliance on central Myanmar for essential services complicate its governance prospects. Bangladesh and India, unlike China or Thailand, remain cautious about engaging with Myanmar's armed groups, further isolating Rakhine from potential external support. Nonetheless, the AA's growing influence has rekindled aspirations for self-determination, dating back to the fall of the Arakan Kingdom in 1785. The AA's ability to balance military success with governance and economic development will determine whether Rakhine achieves meaningful autonomy or remains conflicted.
The AA's near-total control over Rakhine State’s border with Bangladesh also has profound implications for the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT). Historically, the CHT has been a fragile region due to inter-ethnic tensions, insurgent activities, and its strategic location along Myanmar's unstable frontier. With the AA displacing Myanmar's central military authority, the power vacuum is likely to intensify cross-border security concerns, exacerbating arms smuggling, illicit trade, and insurgent movements. The porous nature of the border has already facilitated transnational narcotics trafficking, with groups like the Kuki-Chin National Front (KNF) leveraging regional instability to finance their operations. The KNF's involvement in kidnappings, armed conflicts, and drug smuggling directly threatens the peace and socioeconomic development of the CHT.
Additionally, the AA's dominance in Rakhine raises the risk of further population displacement, as continued conflict or shifts in governance could push new waves of refugees toward Bangladesh, straining resources and increasing local grievances. The complex interplay between the AA’s aspirations for greater autonomy and the KNF’s insurgent activities means that Bangladesh must adopt a proactive strategy to fortify its border, disrupt illicit networks, and prevent external actors from exploiting instability in Rakhine to fuel unrest in the CHT. Without a robust response, the region could face an escalating cycle of violence and insecurity, undermining the stability that has been painstakingly achieved over the years.
Bangladesh must critically assess its policy stance on Rakhine. AA's growing control over the region presents challenges and opportunities for Dhaka. While maintaining formal ties with Myanmar's central government remains essential, Bangladesh must explore semi-formal communication channels with the AA. This dual-track approach could help address pressing issues such as refugee repatriation, border security, and humanitarian aid. Bangladesh should leverage its relationships with regional powers like India and China to facilitate Rohingya repatriation and ensure stability. Additionally, Bangladesh must advocate for international accountability through institutions like the International Court of Justice while fostering a national consensus on its Rohingya policy.
The evolving situation in Rakhine demands a forward-looking response from Bangladesh. While it remains a non-state actor, engaging with the AA is essential for addressing the Rohingya crisis and ensuring regional stability. Bangladesh should focus on building domestic consensus and employing diplomatic soft power. By doing so, Dhaka can be a key player in shaping Rakhine's future while safeguarding its security and humanitarian interests. The time has come for Bangladesh to adopt a pragmatic policy reflecting the realities of its changing neighborhood.
The writer is a political and international affairs analyst
Link : Here
The Arakan Army’s continued consolidation of power in Rakhine State presents opportunities and challenges for Myanmar’s broader resistance movement. If the AA successfully expels the military junta, it could embolden other ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) to intensify offensives. However, this victory could also deepen divisions within the resistance movement, as the AA’s political ambitions may not align with those of other EAOs or the parallel National Unity Government (NUG). Some factions seek a federal democratic union, while the AA may push for complete independence, further complicating efforts to build a unified opposition to the junta.
At the same time, the humanitarian crisis in the Rakhine State is worsening. The growing displacement of civilians, compounded by food shortages and restricted humanitarian access, threatens to create a catastrophe. The situation is particularly dire for the Rohingya, whose future remains uncertain under AA rule. While the group has claimed it will allow Rohingya repatriation, its past actions and lack of concrete policies raise doubts about its commitment to ensuring their safety and rights. If the AA consolidates control over Rakhine, international actors will need to engage cautiously, ensuring that any recognition of AA governance is contingent on protecting all ethnic communities, including the Rohingya.
This is not just a matter of military victories and defeats; Rakhine is central to significant geopolitical calculations. China and India have strategic interests and substantial investments in the Bay of Bengal region surrounding Rakhine. The US Burma Act of 2021 also highlights the importance of the region. None of these powers want its stability disrupted. Regional actors, including Bangladesh, India, and China, closely monitor the situation. For Bangladesh, the instability along its border increases the risk of violence and further refugee displacement. The AA's dominant position in Rakhine will influence the region's fate, Myanmar's ongoing civil conflict, and its implications for regional stability.
Established in 2009, the AA has steadily expanded its influence, now controlling 14 townships in Rakhine State. The loss of the Western Command, crucial for securing China’s investments and India’s Kaladan project, has far-reaching implications for regional geopolitics. Rakhine, rich in natural resources and strategically significant for trade routes, is undergoing profound transformations. The AA’s vision, encapsulated in the “Arakan Dream,” seeks to restore Rakhine’s self-determination. However, the conflict has devastated the local economy and disrupted trade. The AA must now focus on securing the region, establishing inclusive administration, and revitalizing economic ties with India and Bangladesh.
The recent military successes of the AA have led to its near-total control over the Bangladesh-Myanmar border, previously overseen by Myanmar’s Border Guard Police. With the collapse of junta outposts near Maungdaw, Bangladesh faces increasing security challenges, including fears of heightened cross-border instability and a potential surge in refugee movements. Dhaka, already sheltering nearly one million Rohingya refugees, has responded by strengthening border security.
As the junta loses control in Rakhine, whether the AA will pursue diplomatic negotiations with Bangladesh or adopt an isolationist approach remains uncertain. While the AA has indicated a willingness to accept Rohingya refugees, it has not provided a clear framework for their repatriation, complicating Bangladesh’s efforts to address the crisis. Stray mortar shells killing civilians in Bandarban and the influx of 330 Myanmar military personnel seeking refuge further highlight the war’s spillover effects. While Bangladesh successfully repatriated the military personnel, its primary concern remains the situation in the Rakhine State. Although Bangladesh does not support insurgent groups, maintaining a communication channel with the Arakan Army could serve its long-term interests.
Since the 2021 coup, observers speculated that Chin and Kayah States would likely break free of SAC control. However, after renewed fighting in Rakhine, the AA's gains have sparked speculation that Rakhine might be the first to be fully liberated. Even so, questions remain about the extent of this liberation, especially as SAC forces continue bombardments. Armed clashes between the AA and Rohingya groups, such as the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO), and the SAC’s Rohingya recruits, further complicate the situation. Despite challenges, the AA’s successes have ignited local hopes for greater autonomy, a sentiment deeply rooted in Rakhine’s history of resistance against Myanmar’s central rule.
Even if the AA establishes de facto control, it will face challenges in addressing Rakhine's socioeconomic needs. The region's poor transportation connectivity and reliance on central Myanmar for essential services complicate its governance prospects. Bangladesh and India, unlike China or Thailand, remain cautious about engaging with Myanmar's armed groups, further isolating Rakhine from potential external support. Nonetheless, the AA's growing influence has rekindled aspirations for self-determination, dating back to the fall of the Arakan Kingdom in 1785. The AA's ability to balance military success with governance and economic development will determine whether Rakhine achieves meaningful autonomy or remains conflicted.
The AA's near-total control over Rakhine State’s border with Bangladesh also has profound implications for the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT). Historically, the CHT has been a fragile region due to inter-ethnic tensions, insurgent activities, and its strategic location along Myanmar's unstable frontier. With the AA displacing Myanmar's central military authority, the power vacuum is likely to intensify cross-border security concerns, exacerbating arms smuggling, illicit trade, and insurgent movements. The porous nature of the border has already facilitated transnational narcotics trafficking, with groups like the Kuki-Chin National Front (KNF) leveraging regional instability to finance their operations. The KNF's involvement in kidnappings, armed conflicts, and drug smuggling directly threatens the peace and socioeconomic development of the CHT.
Additionally, the AA's dominance in Rakhine raises the risk of further population displacement, as continued conflict or shifts in governance could push new waves of refugees toward Bangladesh, straining resources and increasing local grievances. The complex interplay between the AA’s aspirations for greater autonomy and the KNF’s insurgent activities means that Bangladesh must adopt a proactive strategy to fortify its border, disrupt illicit networks, and prevent external actors from exploiting instability in Rakhine to fuel unrest in the CHT. Without a robust response, the region could face an escalating cycle of violence and insecurity, undermining the stability that has been painstakingly achieved over the years.
Bangladesh must critically assess its policy stance on Rakhine. AA's growing control over the region presents challenges and opportunities for Dhaka. While maintaining formal ties with Myanmar's central government remains essential, Bangladesh must explore semi-formal communication channels with the AA. This dual-track approach could help address pressing issues such as refugee repatriation, border security, and humanitarian aid. Bangladesh should leverage its relationships with regional powers like India and China to facilitate Rohingya repatriation and ensure stability. Additionally, Bangladesh must advocate for international accountability through institutions like the International Court of Justice while fostering a national consensus on its Rohingya policy.
The evolving situation in Rakhine demands a forward-looking response from Bangladesh. While it remains a non-state actor, engaging with the AA is essential for addressing the Rohingya crisis and ensuring regional stability. Bangladesh should focus on building domestic consensus and employing diplomatic soft power. By doing so, Dhaka can be a key player in shaping Rakhine's future while safeguarding its security and humanitarian interests. The time has come for Bangladesh to adopt a pragmatic policy reflecting the realities of its changing neighborhood.
The writer is a political and international affairs analyst
Link : Here
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