EESTi EEST!
By Andrew Korybko
aprill 5, 2024
Russian Permanent Representative to the UN Vasily Nebenzia condemned the UK for calling an open session of the Security Council on Myanmar since “there are things that cannot be discussed in the ‘megaphone diplomacy’ mode” that the British insisted on. Thursday’s talks mostly focused on the situation in Rakhine State, which is where the Bangladeshi-originating Rohingya mostly resided prior to 2017’s conflict pushing most of them into that neighboring nation. Here are some background briefings:
* 5 September 2017: “The Rohingya Crisis: Reality, Rumors and Ramifications”
* 7 September 2017: “The Rohingya Crisis: Conflict Scenarios And Reconciliation Proposals”
The vast majority who fled the Myanmarese military’s (Tatmadaw’s) anti-terrorist campaign against the “Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army” (ARSA) six and a half years ago have yet to return and this remains a major problem in Bangladeshi-Myanmarese relations. Over the past three years since the latest phase of Myanmar’s decades-long civil war began, large parts of Rakhine State have fallen under the control of the “Arakan Army” (AA). Here are some briefings about what’s happened since then:
* 8 February 2024: “Myanmar’s Three-Year-Long Conflict Isn’t As Simple As It Seems At First Glance”
* 23 February 2024: “America Is Preconditioning The Public For More Meddling In Myanmar”
* 5 March 2024: “American Meddling Could Disrupt Myanmar’s Fragile Chinese-Mediated Peace Process”
* 18 March 2024: “Myanmar’s Rebels & Their Foreign Supporters Really Dislike Thailand’s Four-Point Plan”
* 28 March 2024: “TASS’ Interview With Myanmar’s Leader Had An Interesting Connectivity Tidbit”
The newly formed “Three Brotherhood Alliance” of which the AA is a part carried out an unprecedentedly successful nationwide offensive in late October that ended in January after China mediated a fragile ceasefire. The Rakhine dimension of this campaign is significant since the group’s recent advances could disrupt shipping through Sittwe and Kyaukphyu, which are the terminal ports of India’s Kaladan Corridor and the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor respectively.
Nebenzia dropped a bombshell about the AA in his briefing to the UNSC on Thursday:
* 7 September 2017: “The Rohingya Crisis: Conflict Scenarios And Reconciliation Proposals”
The vast majority who fled the Myanmarese military’s (Tatmadaw’s) anti-terrorist campaign against the “Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army” (ARSA) six and a half years ago have yet to return and this remains a major problem in Bangladeshi-Myanmarese relations. Over the past three years since the latest phase of Myanmar’s decades-long civil war began, large parts of Rakhine State have fallen under the control of the “Arakan Army” (AA). Here are some briefings about what’s happened since then:
* 8 February 2024: “Myanmar’s Three-Year-Long Conflict Isn’t As Simple As It Seems At First Glance”
* 23 February 2024: “America Is Preconditioning The Public For More Meddling In Myanmar”
* 5 March 2024: “American Meddling Could Disrupt Myanmar’s Fragile Chinese-Mediated Peace Process”
* 18 March 2024: “Myanmar’s Rebels & Their Foreign Supporters Really Dislike Thailand’s Four-Point Plan”
* 28 March 2024: “TASS’ Interview With Myanmar’s Leader Had An Interesting Connectivity Tidbit”
The newly formed “Three Brotherhood Alliance” of which the AA is a part carried out an unprecedentedly successful nationwide offensive in late October that ended in January after China mediated a fragile ceasefire. The Rakhine dimension of this campaign is significant since the group’s recent advances could disrupt shipping through Sittwe and Kyaukphyu, which are the terminal ports of India’s Kaladan Corridor and the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor respectively.
Nebenzia dropped a bombshell about the AA in his briefing to the UNSC on Thursday:
“We share the concern of Myanmarese authorities about the increased activity of extremist groups in the territory of Rakhine since the end of last year, particularly the so-called Arakan Army. There is a lot of evidence that this militia (as well as the armed opposition in general) is supported by Western countries and used as a lever to achieve their neo-colonial goals.
At the same time, in their public addresses, the US, UK, and their allies demand to increase pressure on the Myanmar leadership to expedite the return of refugees.
While doing so, they leave behind the fact that the actions of their protégés further destabilize the situation in Rakhine and worsen the situation in IDP camps. In other words, the steps of Western countries, who are concerned only with promoting their own geopolitical interests in the region, make it impossible to fulfill their demands to the Myanmar authorities.”
At the same time, in their public addresses, the US, UK, and their allies demand to increase pressure on the Myanmar leadership to expedite the return of refugees.
While doing so, they leave behind the fact that the actions of their protégés further destabilize the situation in Rakhine and worsen the situation in IDP camps. In other words, the steps of Western countries, who are concerned only with promoting their own geopolitical interests in the region, make it impossible to fulfill their demands to the Myanmar authorities.”
This amounts to allegations of waging Hybrid Warfare via terrorists and “weapons of mass migration”.
To explain, Russia has long suspected that the West was arming and politically encouraging Rohingya radicals as a means of dividing-and-ruling this part of Asia, the goal of which would be advanced irrespective of whether its proxies achieved their local objectives. Carving out a “South Asian Kosovo” in “Rohingyaland” would create a new vassal state right on China and India’s doorstep while failing to do so would create a regional refugee crisis that could be weaponized to pit Bangladesh against Myanmar.
The first of those two last-mentioned countries re-elected its long-serving Prime Minister in January despite immense American pressure and the associated Damocles’ sword of a Color Revolution. To oversimplify the US’ geostrategic calculations, it wanted to punish Bangladesh for not dumping Russia and also thought that destabilizing that country could indirectly punish India for the same reason too. Interested readers can learn more about this from the following background briefings:
* 16 April 2023: “Why’s The US Scheming To Carry Out Regime Change In Bangladesh?”
* 26 August 2023: “India’s Reported Pushback Against US Meddling In Bangladesh Is Driven By Security Concerns”
* 23 November 2023: “India’s Honeymoon With The West Might Finally Be Over”
* 26 November 2023: “Russia Warned That The US Might Orchestrate A Color Revolution In Bangladesh”
* 13 December 2023: “Biden’s Reportedly Planned Snubbing Of Modi Bodes Ill For Bilateral Ties”
* 3 January 2024: “Why Are Western Influencers Fearmongering About Indian-Russian Ties?”
* 10 January 2024: “The Outcome Of The Bangladeshi & Bhutanese Elections Gives India Strategic Breathing Space”
* 28 January 2024: “The Bangladeshi Opposition’s New Narrative Is Meant To Maximally Appeal To The West”
The last of these cited analyses is very relevant in the context of the West’s decision to return to the Rohingya issue since the opposition has strong views about it and could galvanize their supporters in response to what might be spun as the ruling party’s “soft” stance. Any unrest that might break out on the pretext of protesting the authorities’ objectively pragmatic approach towards this sensitive issue could also create problems for neighboring India during its six-week-long election from 19 April-1 June.
In particular, it could prompt some Bangladeshis to flee into India’s Northeastern States, which are already under pressure from prior foreign population influxes over the decades that contributed to last year’s Manipur unrest (more information here, here, and here). Any resultant destabilization could give China an intangible edge over its claims to Arunachal Pradesh, which it regards as South Tibet, and therefore dangerously worsen the Sino-Indo rivalry if this incentivizes Beijing to press even harder.
To review the Hybrid War sequence that the West is setting into motion: 1) military-political support for ARSA constituted a national security threat that provoked the Tatmadaw’s 2017 crackdown; 2) the subsequent Rohingya flight to Bangladesh created a regional problem that remains to this day; 3) the UK’s revival of this issue at the UNSC could embolden the radically inclined Bangladeshi opposition; 4) unrest there could spill into India’s Northeastern States; and 5) this could exacerbate Sino-Indo tensions.
The grand strategic trend is that the West wants to divide-and-rule this part of Asia in order to provoke myriad crises that could then be exploited as the “democratic”, “humanitarian”, and “security” pretexts for “Pivoting (back) to Asia” to contain China after the Ukrainian Conflict finally ends. Furthermore, with India and the US continuing to drift apart due to Delhi refusing to subordinate itself to Washington, the West could also weaponize this Hybrid War pressure against it as additional punishment as well.
As cynical as it sounds, the West calculated that there aren’t any serious costs to advancing these plans, with the only potential consequence being that ties with India might deteriorate but it’s unrealistic to expect that this would lead to a rapprochement with China due to their worsening rivalry. Logistical, political, and other factors might complicate this Hybrid War campaign, but there’s no doubt that the West is trying to turn the Rohingya issue into another New Cold War crisis even if it ultimately fails.
To explain, Russia has long suspected that the West was arming and politically encouraging Rohingya radicals as a means of dividing-and-ruling this part of Asia, the goal of which would be advanced irrespective of whether its proxies achieved their local objectives. Carving out a “South Asian Kosovo” in “Rohingyaland” would create a new vassal state right on China and India’s doorstep while failing to do so would create a regional refugee crisis that could be weaponized to pit Bangladesh against Myanmar.
The first of those two last-mentioned countries re-elected its long-serving Prime Minister in January despite immense American pressure and the associated Damocles’ sword of a Color Revolution. To oversimplify the US’ geostrategic calculations, it wanted to punish Bangladesh for not dumping Russia and also thought that destabilizing that country could indirectly punish India for the same reason too. Interested readers can learn more about this from the following background briefings:
* 16 April 2023: “Why’s The US Scheming To Carry Out Regime Change In Bangladesh?”
* 26 August 2023: “India’s Reported Pushback Against US Meddling In Bangladesh Is Driven By Security Concerns”
* 23 November 2023: “India’s Honeymoon With The West Might Finally Be Over”
* 26 November 2023: “Russia Warned That The US Might Orchestrate A Color Revolution In Bangladesh”
* 13 December 2023: “Biden’s Reportedly Planned Snubbing Of Modi Bodes Ill For Bilateral Ties”
* 3 January 2024: “Why Are Western Influencers Fearmongering About Indian-Russian Ties?”
* 10 January 2024: “The Outcome Of The Bangladeshi & Bhutanese Elections Gives India Strategic Breathing Space”
* 28 January 2024: “The Bangladeshi Opposition’s New Narrative Is Meant To Maximally Appeal To The West”
The last of these cited analyses is very relevant in the context of the West’s decision to return to the Rohingya issue since the opposition has strong views about it and could galvanize their supporters in response to what might be spun as the ruling party’s “soft” stance. Any unrest that might break out on the pretext of protesting the authorities’ objectively pragmatic approach towards this sensitive issue could also create problems for neighboring India during its six-week-long election from 19 April-1 June.
In particular, it could prompt some Bangladeshis to flee into India’s Northeastern States, which are already under pressure from prior foreign population influxes over the decades that contributed to last year’s Manipur unrest (more information here, here, and here). Any resultant destabilization could give China an intangible edge over its claims to Arunachal Pradesh, which it regards as South Tibet, and therefore dangerously worsen the Sino-Indo rivalry if this incentivizes Beijing to press even harder.
To review the Hybrid War sequence that the West is setting into motion: 1) military-political support for ARSA constituted a national security threat that provoked the Tatmadaw’s 2017 crackdown; 2) the subsequent Rohingya flight to Bangladesh created a regional problem that remains to this day; 3) the UK’s revival of this issue at the UNSC could embolden the radically inclined Bangladeshi opposition; 4) unrest there could spill into India’s Northeastern States; and 5) this could exacerbate Sino-Indo tensions.
The grand strategic trend is that the West wants to divide-and-rule this part of Asia in order to provoke myriad crises that could then be exploited as the “democratic”, “humanitarian”, and “security” pretexts for “Pivoting (back) to Asia” to contain China after the Ukrainian Conflict finally ends. Furthermore, with India and the US continuing to drift apart due to Delhi refusing to subordinate itself to Washington, the West could also weaponize this Hybrid War pressure against it as additional punishment as well.
As cynical as it sounds, the West calculated that there aren’t any serious costs to advancing these plans, with the only potential consequence being that ties with India might deteriorate but it’s unrealistic to expect that this would lead to a rapprochement with China due to their worsening rivalry. Logistical, political, and other factors might complicate this Hybrid War campaign, but there’s no doubt that the West is trying to turn the Rohingya issue into another New Cold War crisis even if it ultimately fails.
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