The Big Question: Can Myanmar’s Democracy Be Rescued?

Bloomberg

Bloomberg Opinion
Nisid Hajari
18 April 2021, 

A Q&A with Derek Mitchell, former U.S. Ambassador to Myanmar, on how to support the aspirations of Myanmar’s people and build a better future for democracies around the world.

Braving bullets in Yangon.Photographer: STR/AFP

This is one of a series of interviews by Bloomberg Opinion columnists on how to solve today’s most pressing policy challenges. It has been condensed and edited.

Nisid Hajari: Since Myanmar’s military ousted the country’s elected government on Feb. 1, security forces have reportedly killed at least 700 people. Observers are warning that Myanmar risks turning into a Southeast Asian Syria, with a failed economy, open warfare in border areas and refugees pouring into Thailand and India. You served as the U.S.’s ambassador to Myanmar from 2012 to 2016, the first person to hold the position in 22 years. How bad do you think things are going to get there?

Amb. Derek Mitchell, president, National Democratic Institute (NDI): I’m quite worried. Both the military and the people are really dug in, in ways that we really haven’t seen even in the previous coups in Myanmar. Neither side is willing to back down. They almost see this as the culmination of decades of struggle. And I’m not sure, frankly, that the region is waking up to this. I see a lot of the old thinking and traditional analysis of what is going on.

NH: Yes, there is this “realist” view that says we need to deal with Myanmar’s military leaders and not press them too hard. Is that kind of cautious approach workable anymore?

DM: What’s been unleashed within the ethnic armed groups, as well as the young people, women, others — they’re just done. They’re just tired of this, they’re not going to accept this the way they may have 30 years ago or 15 years ago. And you can’t simply say, “Well, be patient until the world solves this over your head.” That’s just a very naive way of viewing the situation. The people of Myanmar have tasted freedom, and they are networked and connected to [protesters] in Hong Kong and Taiwan and Thailand, and they simply are not going to sit back and allow the military to destroy their futures.

NH: Well, what can the outside world do? Western sanctions, even if they’re targeted at the military, are not likely to sway the generals. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has called a summit meeting. But who knows if anything concrete will come out of that. What more could they do?

Amb. Derek Mitchell, president, National Democratic Institute

Photo courtesy NDI

DM: Well, there’s very little more that the West can do. We’ve done the targeted sanctions, we’ve put out the statements, we’ve tried to get our partners and allies in Asia to speak up. That’s very necessary, but ultimately, it's going to have to come down to the region recognizing what's at stake. I think that includes China. I don’t think it’s in anyone’s interest that there be a failed state where [Myanmar] sits. ASEAN can warn Myanmar that its normal status within ASEAN is at stake. They can call together China, India, Japan, the United States and others to consider a complementary, coordinated approach that combines pressure and engagement.

NH: Does the tension between the U.S. and China make it impossible to generate that kind of coordinated action?

DM: I honestly don't think so. In Myanmar, there’s no question the Chinese have a competitive attitude towards the United States. They want to have a privileged place there, they see this as their sphere of influence, they want the U.S. and the West, if not out of the country, at least [to be] of lesser note than the Chinese presence and influence. But I do think that we have a common interest that what is occurring in Myanmar stop. This is where ASEAN really has to show some strength and some vision.

NH: They still need China, though, right? This can’t be resolved without the Chinese on board.

DM: One way of getting China to go along is if they see that that’s where things are moving, that’s where the consensus of Asian nations is. If the U.S., Japan, India, and Singapore and Indonesia and Malaysia are all moving in this direction, that puts enormous pressure on China. And it also puts a lot of pressure on the military in Myanmar. That’s precisely what they don’t want. It’s one of the reasons, arguably, that there was the opening 10 years ago: a recognition by the military that they did not want to be a vassal state under China, that they needed the balancing of America and other states in order to be strong and sovereign.

NH: Ten years ago, you played in a key role in the country’s reopening and transition to civilian rule. Looking back now, how differently were you feeling about the country then?

DM: People always would ask me at every point, “Are you optimistic or pessimistic?” And I hated that question. Because I was neither. That’s not how we should be viewing Myanmar. We should be realistic. I always knew — and I think the Obama administration knew, even if there were some optimistic voices here or there — that this was always on a knife’s edge. I was optimistic about the government [being able] to do positive things over time; they seemed to be credibly interested in opening up the society and in committing to reform. There was a sense that if you invested in this, you’re going to get the political prisoners released, you’re more likely to get an election in 2015 that was credible and potentially a viable peace process [with ethnic militias], which is really central to Myanmar.

But even after the 2015 election, we knew that Aung San Suu Kyi and her party only took over part of the government. The constitution hadn’t changed. The structure of society hadn’t changed. The mindsets hadn’t changed. Capacity was extremely low; institutions were extraordinarily weak; peace had not come close to breaking out; the divisions were as deep as ever. So, you know, the challenges were immense, under the best of circumstances. And therefore, there was never a time where I felt this was irreversible.

NH: Let’s talk about democracy promotion globally. China has the opportunity to play a helpful role in Myanmar. It could also play a very unhelpful role. And that’s true in a lot of places around the world. To what degree do you think China’s rise has influenced what people describe as the retreat of democracy over the last 10-15 years?

DM: I wouldn’t overstate that. I think the Chinese are very adept at being opportunists. They see and seize opportunities where they can. But there are a lot of factors that are causing the regression of democracy globally. One of them is outsize expectations of how easy democracy might be as a system. It’s very hard. Changing mindsets and building strong institutions takes time. You’re also seeing folks who were small “D” democrats, who came to power and ended up becoming more autocratic, who figured out ways to undermine democratic norms over time and game elections and such. So, there are a number of different reasons for why you’re seeing degradation.

I think China adds yet another headwind to democracy simply because they are trying to shape a world that reflects their own illiberal interests. And they are the most resource-rich, aggressive and ambitious among the global powers in trying to shape that illiberal world — a world where free speech, free media, national sovereignty are curbed, particularly when the Chinese don’t like what is being said and done. They operate better in untransparent, autocratic environments. That’s the system they prefer. So yes, they see opportunities now in these countries to empower autocratic elements.

And there may be some — though I think we’re seeing very few, frankly — who really buy into it. Most countries around the world don’t particularly like what China is selling. No one’s saying, “We want to be more autocratic, let’s have a one-party system like China.” But they do want to learn about how China became prosperous because that's what people want most of all.

So, the key for democracies is that they have to deliver. They simply have to find a way to deliver public goods according to popular expectations, or people will look for alternatives.

NH: And what sort of lasting impact, if any, do you think the pandemic is going to have on this struggle?

DM: Fear and insecurity are the enemy of democracy. The pandemic was a time of crisis that played to the strengths of central governments. People typically look to governments for assistance and security, and that can lead to authoritarian opportunism and short-circuiting of democratic processes, which they can say are too slow or inefficient to meet the threat.

We now talk about building back democratically. Whatever sacrifices were made due to the crisis shouldn’t be permanent. So if there are postponed elections, or undermining of civil society or parliamentary oversight functions, that should now be [reversed] as the pandemic starts to recede. The one really big concern I have is the economic impact of the pandemic. The haves seem to have done pretty well and the have nots have regressed drastically, and we’ve lost by some measures a whole generation of development in one year. That, to me, is a ticking time bomb.

NH: Democracy promotion has traditionally been the field of governments and NGOs. But you see now companies caught between China and the U.S. in terms of things like sourcing Xinjiang cotton, taking stands on voting restrictions here in the U.S. — these are battles that they can’t avoid anymore. So should they be thought of as a third player in this effort?

DM: I think so. They have the responsibility to share holders and the bottom line and all of that, but share holders are also recognizing the challenges of global developments. It’s offending their sensibilities and their values. Companies also have staff who are not comfortable with traditional, simple, bottom-line values. Younger people joining companies don’t want to work for places that don’t have a more farsighted view of global affairs.

The largest companies, of course, are akin to countries themselves. [Those in] Silicon Valley need to be partners in shaping digital standards, the use of data, social media. Companies must take responsibility for the algorithms and the incentive structures within their systems that create the alienation, division, atomization and hate and disinformation that are undermining democratic development and making the world safes for autocracy and confusion and chaos. They must take that responsibility.

NH: How much harder does technology make your job now? Ten years ago, we would have thought that technology was the great enabler of democratic movements around the world. And now it seems exactly the opposite.

DM: Well, it still can be positive. It depends on how people and digital systems are wired. There is no doubt that over the past decade, as you say, digital technologies and social media have helped organize and galvanize disempowered people around the world, particularly youth. You saw that in Ukraine, you saw it more recently in Sudan, you’ve seen it even more recently in Hong Kong and in Myanmar. Facts and information are more available to more people than ever, and are potentially a great equalizer. At the same time, the bad guys have discovered how easy it is to subvert technology in order to divide and degrade and confuse, to alienate and traumatize. So, you’ve got to figure out how to counter the way the bad guys are using the online space to their advantage. We have a brand at NDI we call Design for Democracy, where we work with companies and others to help think this through. How do you design the digital space for democracy? That’s a challenge for everyone, not just for the U.S. I think it’s the biggest wild card, frankly.

NH: In your career, you’ve addressed these issues in the worlds of defense and diplomacy and NGOs. Where do you feel like you’ve been most effective? How would you get those worlds to work better together?

DM: There needs to be much more synergy between the worlds, because all three oftentimes are alienated from one another. I mean, the diplomats look at the security or defense people sometimes as just troglodytes, interested only in hard power. And then the defense folks look at diplomats as sometimes compromising away interests and just wanting to get along at all costs. And the NGOs are kind of viewed as well, just annoying — maybe necessary to manage, but not necessarily partners to work with.

And I have to say, when I was in government, I didn’t understand any of all of that. When I was ambassador, I thought of the NGOs as my partners. They both provided added information and were a force multiplier, if we found common interest. That said, without leadership and vision from governments to bring it all together into a coherent strategy, nothing is going to be successful. I think that it’s not whether one or the other is most important, but that each respects what the other brings to the table.

This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.

To contact the author of this story:

Nisid Hajari at nhajari@bloomberg.net

To contact the editor responsible for this story:

Romesh Ratnesar at rratnesar@bloomberg.net

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