AUNG NAING OO | 11 JAN 2019
A friend who follows the peace process from afar wrote to me recently and asked, “Is Myanmar trying to keep a ceasefire that may no longer exist soon?”
His comment came following the suspension of cooperation in November by the two biggest ethnic armed organisations – the Karen National Union (KNU) and Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS) – that signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement in October 2015.
However, for someone like me who has seen the peace process up close and personal, it is a difficult question to answer.
To begin with, there are different statuses with regards to the signatories to the ceasefire agreements and non-signatories. Their situation on the ground differs. So do the conflict resolution tools and resources at our disposal to tackle the problems in case existing ceasefires are broken.
In Myanmar, there are at least three types of groups the nation is dealing with – NCA signatories, bilateral agreements, and those who have yet to sign any truce with the government – to bring armed conflict to an end.
Routinely, clashes have occurred, sometimes devastatingly, with those that have not signed any type of armistice. They include the Arakan Army (AA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army, and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (the Kokang), among others.
There is always potential that fighting can intensify as exemplified by the current clashes between the Tatmadaw and AA in Rakhine State.
This is in spite of the fact the Myanmar Institute for Peace and Security reported fewer clashes with armed groups over the past five months.
Likewise, there have been no or fewer reports of fighting with the groups that entered into bilateral agreements such as the Wa, Shan State Progressive Party and Karenni National Progressive Party, or with the NSCN-K (the Naga).But the situation with the KNU and RCSS has the fragile ceasefire hanging in the balance.
Following the suspension, there are unconfirmed reports of more troop movements in some areas. More landmines have reportedly been deployed. There have been inter-ethnic tensions in Shan State that led to the loss of lives and added restiveness to an already uncertain situation. But no actual fighting has happened.
The civilians in conflict areas, however, are already deeply worried that seven years of peace and stability brought by the bilateral ceasefires and NCA may come to an end.
Personally, I have my worries. Despite of the ceasefire agreements, there are widely known trouble spots. They already exist in the areas controlled by NCA signatories, especially in Shan State and some parts of Kayin State.
Further, the suspension of cooperation is a big roadblock Myanmar has not experienced after the signing of the NCA. While the Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee has strict rules of engagement there is no clear indication how potential conflict can be resolved during the period of suspension mainly because if the groups that initiated the suspension do not come to the table, there is no way the rules can be used.
Anything is possible under the current circumstances. While the possibility of the resumption of hostilities cannot be ruled out at this time, the situation on the ground can also remain unchanged as it stands now.
But the concern is that if the current impasse remains unresolved without a clear timeframe as to when the non-cooperation will cease or the talks can be resurrected, the situation can become extremely untenable.
Such a condition makes the conflict situation extremely uncertain. But there are also reasons not to be too worried.
Both the KNU and RCSS have not said they will leave the NCA or the peace process. They say they just need time to review the process or the situation. The government has not launched any military offensives against them. Nor have the KNU and RCSS resumed fighting.
Understandably, there is so much at stake if the fighting resumes. There seems to be mutual (and unspoken) understanding of the political consequences that have compelled them to stay away from choosing the hard way.
Most importantly, talks are taking place – both officially and unofficially – to bring them back to the process. Smaller and medium-sized groups which are part of the NCA are in talks with the KNU and RCSS to bring them back to the table.
Likewise, the Tatmadaw’s surprise announcement of a unilateral ceasefire in December should lend a huge helping hand to bring about an end to the suspension.
The NCA by nature or by design is a deterrent mechanism and all groups that signed the NCA have exercised self-restraint even if everyone knows that the existing ceasefire is fragile. It means the signatories’ commitment to the NCA remains unchanged.
But it is critical to indicate how soon the suspension will end. At the same time, efforts must be doubled to bring the two groups back to the table. This is mainly to allay the fears of the people in conflict areas and demonstrate commitment to resolving the armed conflict through dialogue.
Aung Naing Oo is the author of the book ‘Lessons Learned from Myanmar’s Peace Process’.
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