The Editors Monday, Feb. 4, 2019
World Politics Review
World Politics Review
Myanmar Border Guard Police officers stand
guard at a village street in northern Buthidaung township, Rakhine
state, Myanmar, July 13, 2017 (AP photo by Esther Htusan).
Intense fighting has returned to western Myanmar’s troubled Rakhine state, this time between the military and the Arakan Army, a well-armed ethnic group that advocates self-governance for the region. At least 26 people have died since fighting erupted in December, and thousands of civilians have been displaced, according to the United Nations. The renewed conflict is likely to further complicate the already difficult process of repatriating hundreds of thousands of Rohingya Muslims living in refugee camps across the border, in Bangladesh. In an interview with WPR, David Scott Mathieson, an independent analyst based in Yangon, Myanmar, discusses the Arakan Army’s recent evolution and explains how the fighting in Rakhine could affect the state’s battered Rohingya community.
World Politics Review: How has the Arakan Army been able to maintain a strong base of arms, funding and local support since its formation in 2009?
David Scott Mathieson: The Arakan Army, or AA, was formed 10 years ago by mobilizing younger ethnic Rakhine, who were angry at what they saw as a lack of justice and opportunity for the Rakhine people and the exploitation of their state’s natural resources. There was also frustration at the time over the moribund state of another older armed group, the Arakan Liberation Army, which is based in eastern Myanmar along the border with Thailand. The AA, which takes its name from the former name for the Rakhine region, mirrored the aspirations of many other nationalistic ethnic groups in Myanmar that have been fighting against central rule for 70 years. It was initially composed of a small group of recruits, trained in northern Myanmar by the well-organized, disciplined and battle-hardened Kachin Independence Army, but it had an opportunity to expand when a 17-year cease-fire between the KIA and the Myanmar government broke down in 2011. Heavy fighting returned to Kachin state, and the AA was able to gain combat experience, access more weapons, and recruit more members from the ranks of Rakhine migrant workers in Kachin state’s teeming jade mines.
By 2014, the AA numbered a few thousand soldiers and announced plans to establish a presence along the western borderlands with Bangladesh. The first armed clashes between the AA and Myanmar’s army were reported the following year, gradually becoming more frequent. A total of 158 military engagements have been reported by the Myanmar military, a majority of which took place over the past year, as the intensity and geographic scope of the AA’s operations has expanded.
In terms of its funding, the AA is suspected of having some involvement in the transit and sale of methamphetamines, sourcing massive production from northern Shan state and smuggling them into Bangladesh. The Myanmar government has arrested and convicted AA officers possessing large amounts of drugs and weapons in Yangon, Myanmar’s largest city, although the AA strenuously denies these charges. Taxes—in some cases effectively extortion—and suspected donations from prominent Rakhine businesspeople provide other revenue streams to finance its well-equipped forces, which explains the patient and methodical build-up over four years.
The AA also enjoys widespread popularity among ethnic Rakhine, driven by a slick social media campaign and effective branding, as shown by its slogan, “The Way of Rakhita.” Rakhita is a call for revolution to liberate the Rakhine people from centuries of domination dating back to the 1784 invasion of the Arakan Kingdom by the Burmese king, which brought the region under central Burman control prior to British colonial rule. It also has a charismatic young leader in Maj. Gen. Tun Mratt Naing, who articulates historical and contemporary grievances that resonate with the local population.
WPR: How might the announced military offensive against the AA be affected by the recent large-scale campaign against the Rohingya in Rakhine state?
Mathieson: The AA had already begun to expand their operations in Rakhine state before the 2016 and 2017 “clearance operations” that drove out the Rohingya. In multiple media interviews, the AA leadership declared that targeting the Muslim population was not their intention and warned ethnic Rakhine not to get involved in the violence in any way. They viewed it as a trap to divert them from the real enemy: the Myanmar government. That said, many Rohingya who remain in the area will be highly vulnerable to military abuses, as well as possible future targeting by AA forces, whom analysts believe harbor the same deeply rooted animus toward the Rohingya as many ethnic Rakhine.
Thousands of Myanmar army troops are now deploying to Rakhine state in response to the government’s vow to “crush” the AA. This campaign will likely trigger a protracted insurgency, frustrating even the best plans for refugee repatriation and potentially even spurring a new wave of Rohingya fleeing the war zone into Bangladesh. The government and military’s harsh rhetoric against the AA is mirrored, even more violently, against the Rohingya and the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, or ARSA, the group responsible for the attacks on police outposts in August 2017 that triggered the subsequent large-scale crackdown on the Rohingya. ARSA has reportedly resumed cross-border raids from Bangladesh. This three-way war could further destabilize Rakhine state. To make matters worse, the government has blocked access for the United Nations and international aid organizations to the five townships in Rakhine state affected by the fighting, curtailing humanitarian assistance and making documentation of human rights violations more difficult.
WPR: What is the latest on planned repatriations of Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh back to Rakhine state, and how might the crackdown on the AA disrupt that process?
Mathieson: The recent intensification of fighting between the AA and Myanmar security forces will be only one of several factors making large-scale repatriation highly unlikely in the near term. Over 700,000 Rohingya fled in abject fear from the brutal state crackdown that began in August 2017, and the widespread arson, abuse and killings that accompanied it. People do not return easily after horrific violence like that. It is important to note that this is the third large-scale violent expulsion of the Rohingya, following similar campaigns in 1978 and 1991, with this latest round by far the most extensive and brutal. Most of the Rohingya who fled would be unlikely to return to houses, livelihoods and communities that have been destroyed, especially because they would be returning to the same crushing apartheid-like conditions that authorities have long imposed on them.
Further, there is almost zero trust in the Myanmar government among the Rohingya, and authorities’ preparations for refugee returns are unconvincing and inhumane. So-called repatriation camps resemble detention facilities, and there are no clear plans to grant citizenship to stateless Rohingya, much less the basic rights that have long been denied to them. Meanwhile, the refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar, a coastal town in southern Bangladesh, are stable and relatively well-serviced, despite massive overcrowding and fears of the inevitable natural disasters that affect the area. There are also factions within the Rohingya community that want to defer repatriation until they can secure guaranteed political rights.
All of these factors were serious impediments even before the AA escalated attacks, making safe and dignified repatriation highly unlikely. Any forced returns would breach the 1951 Refugee Convention and its principle of “nonrefoulement,” which prohibits states from returning a refugee “to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened.” But if the refugee camps contribute to instability in Bangladesh, there may be future refoulement.
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